1730 God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of
a person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed
that man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel,' so that he might
of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed
perfection by cleaving to him."
Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and
is master over his acts. (St. Irenaeus, Adv. haeres. 4,4,3:PG 7/1,983.)
I. Freedom and Responsibility
1731 Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to
act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's
own responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life. Human freedom
is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its
perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.
1732 As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate
good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and
evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This
freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or
blame, merit or reproach.
1733 The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. There is no
true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. The choice
to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to "the slavery
1734 Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they
are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance
the mastery of the will over its acts.
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or
even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate
attachments, and other psychological or social factors.
1736 Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:
Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is this
that you have done?"
He asked Cain the same question. The prophet Nathan questioned David in
the same way after he committed adultery with the wife of Uriah and had
An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence
regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an accident
arising from ignorance of traffic laws.
1737 An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for
instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect
is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of
an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For
a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must
have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused
by a drunken driver.
1738 Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings. Every
human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be
recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this
duty of respect. The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in moral
and religious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of
the human person. This right must be recognized and protected by civil
authority within the limits of the common good and public order.
II. Human Freedom in the Economy Of Salvation
1739 Freedom and sin. Man's freedom is limited and fallible. In fact,
man failed. He freely sinned. By refusing God's plan of love, he deceived
himself and became a slave to sin. This first alienation engendered a multitude
of others. From its outset, human history attests the wretchedness and
oppression born of the human heart in consequence of the abuse of freedom.
1740 Threats to freedom. The exercise of freedom does not imply a right
to say or do everything. It is false to maintain that man, "the subject
of this freedom," is "an individual who is fully self-sufficient
and whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the enjoyment
of earthly goods." Moreover, the economic, social, political, and
cultural conditions that are needed for a just exercise of freedom are
too often disregarded or violated. Such situations of blindness and injustice
injure the moral life and involve the strong as well as the weak in the
temptation to sin against charity. By deviating from the moral law man
violates his own freedom, becomes imprisoned within himself, disrupts neighborly
fellowship, and rebels against divine truth.
1741 Liberation and salvation. By his glorious Cross Christ has won salvation
for all men. He redeemed them from the sin that held them in bondage. "For
freedom Christ has set us free." In him we have communion with the "truth
that makes us free." The Holy Spirit has been given to us and, as
the Apostle teaches, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom."
Already we glory in the "liberty of the children of God."
1742 Freedom and grace. The grace of Christ is not in
the slightest way a rival of our freedom when this freedom accords with
the sense of the true and the good that God has put in the human heart.
On the contrary, as Christian experience attests especially in prayer,
the more docile we are to the promptings of grace, the more we grow in
inner freedom and confidence during trials, such as those we face in the
pressures and constraints of the outer world. By the working of grace the
Holy Spirit educates us in spiritual freedom in order to make us free collaborators
in his work in the Church and in the world:
Almighty and merciful God,
in your goodness take away from us all that is harmful,
so that, made ready both in mind and body,
we may freely accomplish your will.
1743 "God willed that man should be left in the hand of his own counsel
(cf. Sirach 15:14), so that he might of his own accord seek his creator and
freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him" (Vatican II, Gaudium et spes
17 § 1).
1744 Freedom is the power to act or not to act, and so to perform deliberate
acts of one's own. Freedom attains perfection in its acts when directed
toward God, the sovereign Good.
1745 Freedom characterizes properly human acts. It makes the human being
responsible for acts of which he is the voluntary agent. His deliberate
acts properly belong to him.
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished
or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or social
1747 The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in religious and
moral matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of man. But
the exercise of freedom does not entail the putative right to say or do
1748 "For freedom Christ has set us free" (Galatians 5:1).